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The history of the Canadian army at the beginning of the 20th century is most often 
defined by its operational participation in the 
South African War. Between 1899 and 1902 
Canada dispatched a few thousand soldiers to 
fight for British interests against Boer settlers, a 
commitment that had a considerable impact on 
both the evolution of Canada’s fledgling army as 
well as Canadian politics in general. The sheer 
magnitude of this event overshadowed just about 
every other British and Canadian army activity at 
the time, but it was by no means the only conflict 
in which Canadian soldiers were then engaged. 
In addition to helping secure the veldt of the 
Transvaal for Great Britain, Canada’s soldiers 
were also active participants in a number of other 
campaigns across equatorial Africa. Though 
there were fewer troops who served as part of a 
general frontier force instead of being organized 
into specific Canadian units, their presence was 
influential and at times critical for operational 
success in these other theatres of conflict.
 This article examines the role played by 
Canadians at the turn of the century in West 
Africa.2 Though not intended to draw sweeping 
conclusions about the influence of such operations 
on the Canadian army as a whole – such analysis 
must follow at a later time when more contextual 
evidence is available – it does rediscover a largely 
forgotten chapter in the origins and evolution of 
the army, as well as raise a number of questions 
that obviously deserve greater attention. Most 
important, perhaps, this article demonstrates 
that a new approach to the analysis of the pre-
1914 Canadian army is required, one that focuses 
as much on the influence of those who left Canada 
for military service as those who remained within 
the ranks of the institution at home.
 There is little question that the development 
of a better understanding of the pre-Great War 
Canadian Army is long overdue. Existing literature 
too often focuses solely on how the British army 
controlled and influenced a nascent Canadian 
militia.3 As this article reveals, not only are such 
analyses incomplete but they do not reverse the 
lens and examine how Canada and Canadians 
influenced the British army and its operations 
abroad during the same period.4 A more complete 
picture of Canadian army evolution can only exist 
through such an examination, and this article 
touches on but one topic that brings new evidence 
for that reassessment.
The British Empire in West Africa5
During the late Victorian and Edwardian eras, the relationship of Europe and Africa was 
in the midst of a great transition. For centuries 
Africa had been the “Dark Continent,” a vast 
and impenetrable unknown to the European 
adventurer, often perceived as a place of witch 
doctors, juju cults, cannibalism, and savagery 
into which one dare not venture. Since the late 
15th century, the valuable trading commodities 
of West Africa were brought from the interior by 
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permanent forces of Canada.”
Lieutenant-Colonel William Heneker’s narrative of the
Ibeku-Olokoro Expedition, Southern Nigeria, 19021
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native groups for exchange with the Europeans, 
few of whom ever ventured inland from the 
trading forts they built along the coast. As British 
historian R.B. Magor later noted, “The main 
products traded were slaves, palm oil, and gold, 
in that order of importance.”6
 From the beginning of the 19th century, 
however, the British renounced their participation 
in the slave trade, and set themselves to blocking 
everyone else engaged in the activity. Both the 
Europeans and Arabs who shipped the slaves 
and the native kings who sold them were soundly 
reproved by British sailors and soldiers who 
imposed their anti-slavery views justified by a 
mixture of religion and reformism backed up 
by artillery, Maxim machine guns and rifles. By 
extension, the British were developing an interest 
in the internal governance of West Africa by the 
mid-19th century. Having begun that century 
without ambitions beyond holding their collection 
of trading enterprises along the coast, they closed 
it by endeavouring to extend their involvement 
to full-fledged imperial rule as deep inland as 
possible.
 The British, however, were not the only 
Europeans with designs on ruling the region. 
The Dutch, Portuguese, and Spanish had all been 
there, but were no longer serious contenders 
against the rising British military and commercial 
power. Instead it was the French and Germans 
who challenged the British. While the British 
were seizing the hinterlands of the Gold Coast 
[now Ghana] and the Niger coast, the Germans 
seized Togoland and Cameroon on the east side 
of these British claims. There was some friction 
and disputes among traders and officials on the 
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scene, but agreements were soon reached in a 
more or less gentlemanly fashion. The manner 
in which Europeans resolved their African 
boundaries is neatly described in the comments 
of Britain’s Foreign Minister Salisbury upon a 
subsequent boundary treaty with the French: “We 
have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps 
where no white man’s foot has ever trod…We 
have been giving away mountains and rivers and 
lakes to each other, only hindered by the small 
impediment that we never knew exactly where 
the mountains and rivers and lakes were.”7
 Contrary to popular conception, the delegates 
at the Berlin Conference of 1885 did not lay out 
all the borders of modern Africa.8 While they 
did resolve a few disputes about jurisdiction on 
certain rivers and a few boundary disputes in 
the Congo basin, the main achievement of the 
conference was the establishment of some rules 
for mitigating disputes among themselves in the 
years to come as they laid their claims to the rest. 
Over the next three decades, seven European 
nations extended their dominions inland from 
the coast, and as they ran up against each other’s 
claims, they resolved their boundary disputes in 
a series of bilateral treaties.
 While the British had stayed on good terms 
with the Germans as they worked out their 
disputes, they nearly went to war with the French 
over territorial claims in West Africa. The French 
were energetically advancing their territories 
in the region, while Britain vacillated about 
whether to expend the effort to move inland. 
Under Salisbury, British policy was to secure 
east Africa, flanking as it does the vital corridor 
to India, and let the French have most of West 
Africa without much contest.9 But when Joseph 
Chamberlain became Colonial Secretary in 1895, 
he launched a vigorous drive to prevent any more 
inland and western territory from falling into 
French hands by default. As things stood when 
Chamberlain took office, the French already had 
much more territory and troops in West Africa 
than the British. If Britain were to stake out and 
defend anything significant, the forces on hand 
would have to be strengthened.
 In July 1897, as contentions grew sharp 
between British and French rivals over the 
regions north of Lagos, Chamberlain instigated 
the amalgamation of the miscellaneous British 
military units then in West Africa into a unified 
regional army, known as the West African Frontier 
Force (WAFF). Frederick Dealtry Lugard was 
gazetted to be its first commandant on 26 August 
1897.10 Though only listed as a captain in his 
regiment, within the army he was a brevet-major, 
and in his new assignment as commanding officer 
of the WAFF he was granted the local rank of 
colonel.
 As an organization the WAFF evolved over 
several years between 1897 and 1901. Initially 
comprised of two battalions of the Northern 
Nigeria Regiment, by 1902 it also included one 
battalion of the Southern Nigeria Regiment, the 
Lagos Battalion, the Sierra Leone Battalion, a 
battalion and a half of the Gold Coast Regiment, 
and the Gambia Company.11 The ranks of these 
infantry units were comprised of African natives, 
while the officer corps was made up of white men 
from Britain and its colonies. As they had long 
been doing in India, the British developed strong 
prejudices in favour of recruiting certain races 
for their purported martial qualities. In West 
Africa, the Hausa was the most favoured tribe, 
and in English usage “Hausas” was sometimes 
used as a generic term for African soldiers. A 
detailed treatment of the tribal constituents of 
the WAFF can be found in Haywood and Clarke’s, 
History of the Royal West African Frontier Force, 
which shows that the British, even when local 
recruiting sources were scarce, strove to create as 
professional and capable a force as possible, even 
if only a small one. Securing officers to lead these 
units was another matter, as only “proper white 
gentlemen” would suffice for such a role. Without 
such resources readily available locally, the War 
Office had to look elsewhere for the solution.
 While the WAFF was still taking shape in 
late 1897 and early 1898, it did its best to show 
the flag and thereby validate British claims in 
the disputed areas (Borgu, Bussa, Say, Sokoto, 
Katsina) north of Lagos, in the midst of numerically 
superior French forces who were there doing the 
same. Thus before the WAFF was fully born it was 
being used by Colonial Secretary Chamberlain as 
a sabre to rattle at the French. Had there been 
a war, the WAFF’s prospects against the vastly 
larger French forces in the area would have been 
uncertain no matter what its quality, although 
British naval preponderance held the promise 
of eventual success if Britain could commit large 
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resources to reverse possible initial defeats. In 
the end, no war came, and France and England 
reached a diplomatic agreement on many West 
African boundaries in a convention signed on 14 
June 1898. With the main threat removed for 
the moment, the British turned their attention to 
securing the local population’s governance for the 
eventual introduction of British commerce and 
trade. Several Canadians would ultimately take 
part in shaping these events.
British Recruiting Policy and 
Practices in Canada
As the British Empire continued to expand its influence across the African continent, 
its forces and, in particular, its officer corps was 
seriously overstretched. Constantly increasing 
demands for new subalterns since the end of 
the Second Afghan War (1870-1880), especially 
technically trained ones such as artillery officers 
and engineers, pushed the War Office in London 
to begin scouting for new officers among its 
colonies to fill the widening gap. Canada offered 
a tempting and easy source. With a nascent army 
of its own and a recently created Royal Military 
College that showed great promise in its focus 
on technical education and training, the country 
soon became a preferred recruiting ground for 
British operational needs overseas.
 Despite the fact that the British North American 
colonies had entered into a confederation in 
1867, the new dominion remained very much a 
loyal subject of the British Empire and English 
Canadian families continued to encourage their 
sons to join the ranks of the British army just as 
much as Canada’s military. There were plenty of 
reasons for making such a choice ranging from 
the romantic to the practical, but it is perhaps 
most important to note that at the time service in 
one army was not perceived as making a sleight 
towards the other.
 From a practical perspective, in the latter half 
of the 19th century those desiring the military life 
as a professional soldier in Canada were often 
left wanting if they stayed at home. Just prior to 
the departure of the British army from Canada 
in 1871, the War Office in London offered to 
transfer to Canada the Royal Canadian Rifles, 
a British regular army battalion that had been 
raised in Canada primarily from British veterans. 
Ottawa politely rejected the offer, suggesting that 
the government was not yet ready to finance a 
permanent standing force of regular soldiers. 
The government did authorize the formation of 
two regular force artillery batteries to man the 
critical fortresses at Quebec City and Kingston 
once the British left. This was done just in case 
the United States saw the British withdrawal as 
an opportunity for another invasion of Canada. 
These two batteries formed the entirety of the 
regular Canadian army in 1871. The remainder 
of the confederation’s military was composed of 
part-time, partially trained militia. Expansion of 
the permanent force with infantry and cavalry 
schools in 1883 raised the entire strength of 
regular army to barely a thousand personnel. 
There were few options in Canada for one seeking 
a career in the military.12
 Canada’s army had not yet embarked on 
its future development as an expeditionary 
force, with the first governments often unable 
or unwilling to fill requests from London for 
the dispatch of troops in support of British 
operations overseas while it was still struggling to 
create law, order, good government and security 
at home.13 Still, with the exception of the 1885 
Northwest Rebellion and the endless requests 
for aid from the various civilian authorities to 
restore public order, officers could expect little 
excitement beyond garrison life, social events, 
and daily drill.14 There was little opportunity for 
real soldiering of the kind witnessed in British 
army actions across the frontiers of the empire, 
and British officers posted to Canada during this 
period often described their assignment as safe, 
healthy, expensive, and dull.15 Thus for those 
Canadians who saw the military as a calling or 
an escape, the British army presented the best 
opportunities to bring honour to self and family 
in the latter half of the 19th century.16
 Though Canada’s permanent force remained 
relatively small, the Royal Military College of 
Canada (RMC) at Kingston, Ontario, was opened 
in 1876 to educate and train young gentleman 
for service as officers in the militia, but also to 
train them as engineers and managers for the 
civil service and private industry to stimulate 
the economic development of the young country. 
The curriculum was based upon the American 
West Point model, with mathematics forming 
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the base of all degrees and certificates.17 The 
first cadets graduated in 1880. Most emerged 
with qualifications as artillery or engineering 
officers.18
 The War Office in London sent notice to 
Ottawa offering immediate commissions in 
the British army for the top four gentleman 
cadets graduating out of the first RMC class 
of 18 officers.19 Major-General Edward Selby 
Smyth, a British officer engaged by the Canadian 
government to command the militia, commented 
in his annual report in 1878 that taking up this 
offer would be “another link in the chain that binds 
us altogether.”20 It was hoped by some that such 
British employment of Canadian soldiers would 
change government attitudes about eventually 
deploying Canadian troops overseas, and act as 
a preliminary move towards the establishment 
of Canadian permanent force units that could be 
easily interchanged with British units.21
 The first Canadians commissioned into the 
British army from RMC showed tremendous 
ability and promise, and increasing numbers 
of Canadian officer graduates were recruited 
throughout the 1880s in an effort to fill gaps in 
the British army’s officer corps. In some instances 
successful recruitment even seemed critical to 
survival. A Russian victory over Afghan forces at 
Penjdeh in Transcaspia in March 1885 caused 
great concern in the War Office in London about 
the state of operational readiness of the British 
army. It was felt that if Britain had to engage the 
Russians the army would be at a disadvantage 
because of large shortages of qualified officers.
 In April 1885 the War Office offered to Canada 
an additional 26 commissions in the British 
army over and above the four commissions 
normally offered every year. In particular it 
sought six artillery officers, ten engineer officers, 
and ten officers of either infantry or cavalry.22 
Furthermore if RMC and its recent graduates 
could not fill the positions, London was prepared 
to offer the commissions to officers of the 
Canadian permanent force and even the active 
militia if suitable candidates might be found. 
Britain eventually received 28 officers from RMC 
alone in that year.23
 In 1888 the War Office offered, in addition to 
the usual four commissions, six commissions in 
the Royal Engineers and two in the Royal Artillery. 
The Canadian gentlemen cadets soon filled them 
all.24 Such offers were indicative of Britain’s 
confidence in Canada’s ability to produce 
professionally competent officers for service in 
either colonial or British forces. Some might 
argue that London simply had no choice but to 
engage Canadian soldiers, but it did. There was a 
plethora of British militia officers to choose from 
not counting its own engineer and artillery officer 
graduates. However, those Canadian officers 
who had entered into British service performed 
admirably, and the War Office could see no reason 
not to continue its exploitation of Canada’s RMC 
and permanent force. By 1889, Britain had 
taken 75 RMC cadets into the British army, over 
a quarter of all cadets that had graduated from 
Kingston thus far.25
 In addition to recruiting directly from RMC, 
the War Office regularly accepted applications 
for both imperial commissions as well as 
secondments from the Canadian permanent 
force and militia. This policy allowed other 
Canadians such as Lieutenant A.H. Macdonnell 
of the permanent force or Lieutenant Henry Read 
of the Canadian militia to offer their services and 
obtain local commissions in the WAFF.26
Canadian Officers in West Africa
Canadians who left the relatively benign environment of Canada for service on the 
dangerous and deadly West African coast were 
well aware of the challenges that awaited them. 
Since the mid-1860s, both British and American 
newspapers carried regular dispatches from 
“the dark continent,” written explorers and 
missionaries.27 They presented sometimes hair-
raising yet alluring characterizations of life and 
service in Africa, and the fame and fortune often 
accorded to such intrepid travelers certainly 
seemed worth the potential risks involved.
 An examination of the existing evidence 
indicates that Canadian officers in British and 
Canadian service were present in operations in 
Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, and Northern and 
Southern Nigeria, all of the theatres of conflict 
in western Africa except the Gambia, which will 
nevertheless be discussed in the interests of 
completeness.
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The Gambia
Of all the West African theatres during the period, the Gambia saw the least amount 
of conflict. A series of punitive expeditions were 
carried out against the local ruler, Chief Fodeh 
Cabbah, who was resisting incursions by the 
Anglo-French Boundary Commission through 
his country during 1891 and 1892. The following 
year another expedition was launched, this time 
against Chief Fodeh Silah, a cunning slave raider 
and skillful tactician who for some time was 
launching forays against the district west of Cape 
St. Mary and generally threatening the fledging 
British colony of Gambia.28 British attempts to 
capture Silah and put an end to his activities met 
with considerable difficulties, and only after a 
couple of failed attempts were the British finally 
able to launch a successful expedition and force 
Silah to flee in March 1894. No other serious 
conflicts occurred in the region, save for a single 
punitive expedition in early 1900 to chase down 
a band of men who had murdered two British 
traveling commissioners and their escort.
 The nature of the inland water operations in 
the Gambia precluded the large-scale involvement 
of land forces, with the majority of forces being 
made up of Royal Navy sailors, Royal Marines, 
or members of the West India Regiment.29
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone was witness to a number of local conflicts between 1887 and 1905. Comprising 
a region of approximately 77,700 square 
kilometers and a population of approximately 
two million, the borders of Sierra Leone stretched 
from the Great Scaries River in the north to the 
Great Bum River in the south and as far inland as 
the Niger River tributary. Very little of the region 
stood far above sea level, consisting mostly of 
swampy mangrove bush and thick rain forest 
that became grasslands and orchard bush only 
some 160 kilometers inland from the coast. In 
this area two Canadians distinguished themselves 
in combat.
 Born in Kingston, Ontario in March 1858, 
Captain Huntley Brodie Mackay graduated 
from RMC with a commission in the Royal 
Engineers and first served in Africa as a Special 
Service Officer under Sir Charles Warren in 
the Bechuanaland Expedition in 1884-85.30 He 
was appointed Commanding Royal Engineers 
(CRE) in West Africa in 1887, and later served 
in Sierra Leone where he assisted Colonel Sir 
Francis Walker de Winton in the 1887-88 punitive 
expeditions against the Yonnie tribe. It was an 
arduous and dangerous campaign against a 
skillful adversary, and Captain Mackay came 
close to being killed on a number of occasions 
as the expedition was repeatedly ambushed 
on its way to destroy the Yonnie stronghold at 
Robari. For his consistently outstanding efforts 
and personal courage Mackay was awarded the 
Distinguished Service Order.31 While serving as 
acting administrator to the Imperial British East 
Africa Company he contracted fever and died at 
Mombassa on 10 April 1891. It was an all-too 
typical end for a man serving in West Africa at 
that time.
 Perhaps the most notable Canadian to serve 
in Sierra Leone was William Henry Robinson. 
Born in Saint John, New Brunswick in July 
1863 he entered the Royal Military College at 
Kingston in 1879. Upon graduation he accepted 
a commission in the Royal Engineers, completing 
his training at Woolwich, England. Soon after he 
received orders for service in West Africa.
 In 1889 Captain Robinson replaced Captain 
Mackay as the CRE in West Africa. He was serving 
in Sierra Leone in 1891 when a local warrior 
leader named Karimu attacked a patrol of the 
Sierra Leone Frontier Police. Karimu had already 
made a name for himself in the region leading 
bands of fighters belonging to Chief Bari Bureh 
against local tribes under British protection near 
the Limba Susu border. Karimu operated out 
of a stockade stronghold at Tambi on the River 
Scaries, and the Sierra Leone Frontier Police 
mounted an operation to kill or capture him. 
In March 1892 Captain Robinson was assigned 
the task of leading a small force to Tambi to 
get Karimu and kill or disperse his men. When 
Robinson and his party of Sierra Leone Frontier 
Police attacked the stockade on 14 March, 
however, Karimu was ready and repulsed the 
initial assault. The momentum lost, Captain 
Robinson tried to rally the attack by personally 
setting explosive charges at the gates to blow them 
open and allow his men to rush through. Despite 
heavy fire he succeeded but was shot dead during 
the assault. Their leader killed, the frontier 
police were repulsed and soon abandoned the 
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men of the West India Regiment, 125 Sierra Leone 
Frontier Police, 400 local African militia, as well 
as a naval landing party of 175 men equipped with 
7-pounder artillery pieces, rockets, and Maxim 
machine guns. Within a month, the Tambi  fort 
was breached and destroyed, with the remnants 
of Karimu’s force fleeing to another stronghold 
named Toniataba. The British-led expedition 
assaulted it on 28 April, effectively putting an 
end to Karimu and his allies for good.
 In December 1899 an editorial in a Canadian 
newspaper suggested that Robinson would have 
been awarded the Victoria Cross for his actions 
at Tambi had he not been killed in action. At 
the time of his death, the standing policy was 
that VCs were not awarded posthumously. 
This changed in 1902 to allow such awards, 
but a clause making it retroactive for previous 
actions was not added until 1907. By that time, 
unfortunately, Robinson’s valiant actions against 
an unknown warlord in an obscure part of West 
Africa 15 years earlier were all but forgotten.
 Active service in Sierra Leone was often 
deadly and Canadian officers knew it. Gentleman 
Cadet Bertie Harold Oliver Armstrong was lucky 
to survive his own experience. He graduated 
from RMC in 1893 and received a commission 
into the Royal Engineers and was also assigned 
to West Africa. Captain Armstrong served as an 
intelligence officer in Sierra Leone in 1898-99 
during the uprising later known as the “Hut 
Tax War,” where he was largely responsible for 
assessing enemy strengths and fortifications and 
assisting with the development of operational 
plans to defeat the insurgency. Following the end 
of the conflict in March 1899, Armstrong was 
appointed CRE for West Africa, making him the 
fourth Canadian to hold this post since 1887.
The Gold Coast
The Asante (or Ashanti) Empire, with whom the British fought a series of wars between 
1820 and 1900, occupied a large region of the 
Gold Coast between the River Komoe and the 
Volta Rivers. The Ashanti were perhaps the most 
difficult adversaries ever faced in West Africa and 
their eventual subjugation was difficult, lengthy, 
and very costly in lives on both sides.33
 Early British attempts to colonize the area 
along the Gold Coast foreshadowed the difficulties 
to come. When the Ashanti began raiding British 
settlements in the 1820s, the colony’s governor, 
Sir Charles MacCarthy, organized the Royal 
African Colonial Corps (RACC) of Light Infantry 
to protect his citizens. In 1824 the Ashanti king 
annihilated the RACC at Isamankow where 
the governor was also killed. Triumphant, the 
Ashanti King Osei Bonsu added MacCarthy’s 
skull to his royal regalia as a drinking cup.
 British footholds along the Gold Coast were 
not solidified until after the Ashanti War of 
1873-74. Canadians began entering this theatre 
sometime after, with many seeing action against 
the Ashanti at one point or another. RMC’s 
Gentleman Cadet No.79 John Irvine Lang-Hyde 
was commissioned into the Royal Engineers in 
1883, and a decade later he was assigned to West 
Africa to conduct an extensive survey of the Gold 
fight. Captain William H. Robinson was the first 
graduate of RMC to be killed in action.32
 The untimely death of Captain Robinson 
caused a tremendous outrage in London. New 
officers were immediately sent out from England 
to organize a response, and soon assembled 550 
Born in Kingston and a graduate of RMC, Captain Huntley 
Brodie Mackay served in Bechuanaland in 1884-85 and 
then after in Sierra Leone as the Commanding Royal 
Engineer for West Africa. Awarded the DSO, he died on 
active service in 1891.
Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC) photo archives
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Coast while serving as the second-in-command 
of the Attabalu Expeditionary Force. He went on 
to be employed in the Anglo-French boundary 
commission in Nigeria during 1900-1, completing 
a survey of both the railway as well as the most 
western boundary of the Gold Coast colony. He 
was later made a Companion of the Order of St. 
Michael and St. George (CMG) for his efforts, 
and eventually served with the Royal Engineers 
during the First World War.
 Captain Casimir VanStraubanzee, another 
RMC graduate who obtained a commission 
with the Royal Artillery, served in the 1895-
96 Ashanti War as a special service officer. Yet 
another, Captain D.S. MacInnes, also served in 
the Gold Coast in 1897-98.34 During this time a 
vast number of expeditions were launched from 
Accra in all directions as the British attempted 
to occupy some of the hinterland that was then 
being rapidly parceled out among French and 
German expeditions. As a Royal Engineer officer 
supporting these expeditions, MacInnes was 
responsible for communications and logistics, as 
well as a number of engineering duties such as 
route maintenance, geographical survey, bridges, 
and general construction. Both VanStraubanzee 
and MacInnes survived their tours of duty in West 
Africa and had lengthy military careers.
Northern and Southern Nigeria
Of all the areas of conflict on the West African coast, Nigeria presented perhaps the largest 
challenge for British forces. A vast theatre divided 
into a northern and southern region, the WAFF 
was embroiled in continuous conflict in Nigeria 
between 1892 and the end of the First World 
War.
 The Nigerian operations demanded huge 
expeditions and many white officers to lead 
them. Canadians were present, often in large 
numbers. Existing evidence suggests that the 
Captain William Henry Robinson was the ﬁrst RMC 
graduate killed in action in West Africa. He was 
recommended for the VC and his death caused 
outrage both in London and Ottawa. (RMCC Photo)
largest concentration of Canadians in West Africa 
was here, including many RMC graduates, one 
of whom often served as expedition commander. 
As well, a number of the Canadians serving were 
not in the British Army, but rather remained 
officers in the Canadian permanent force or 
militia seconded for duty in the WAFF. This is 
particularly interesting, as it is not well known 
that Canadian officers served as members of the 
Canadian Forces in combat operations abroad 
during this period.
 Kenneth J.R. Campbell was one of the 
first Canadians to serve in this theatre. Having 
graduated from RMC in 1881 he was unable 
to secure a commission in either the British or 
Canadian forces and ended up enlisting as private 
soldier in the Gloucester Regiment. It was not 
long before his superiors became aware of his 
RMC qualification and provided a commission 
in the 6th Dragoon Guards. He soon transferred 
to the Suffolk Regiment as he sought an infantry 
command. In 1894, he served in operations in 
the Niger Coast Protectorate against Chief Nanna 
on the Benin River. Captain Campbell fought at 
the capture of Brohemie with distinction and 
was mentioned-in-dispatches and awarded the 
Distinguished Service Order.35 At the time of this 
action, Campbell was already serving as deputy 
consul-general and acting commissioner of the 
Oil River Protectorate, eventually becoming the 
consul-general.36 Campbell later commanded the 
Naval Brigade at the Relief of Pekin during the 
Boxer Rebellion in 1900. He also served in the 
navy and the army during the First World War.
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 Other Canadians followed. Captain H.C. 
Carey served with the Royal Engineers in the 
Niger Coast Protectorate between 1895 and 1896. 
Captain Robert Cockburn, a militia officer serving 
in the 3rd Canadian Dragoons, transferred first 
to the Suffolk Regiment and then later to the West 
African Field Force. Records show that he served 
in theatre between 1899 and 1902.37
 Captain L.C.A. de B. Doucet was one of 
the few francophone Canadians to serve in 
West Africa. After graduating from the Royal 
Military College with a commission in the Royal 
Engineers, he was assigned to West Africa in 
1903. Doucet was an expert geographer, having 
shown considerable skill in his early career. In 
theatre, he was tasked to a special duty under the 
Colonial Office in connection with the Yola-Chad 
Boundary Commission, a difficult mission that 
he performed admirably.
The Anglo-Aro War
in Southern Nigeria
Canadian participation in the pacification of West Africa appeared to climax in late 1901 
when the British launched a substantial civil-
military operation against the group of the Ibo 
tribe whose influence extended between the Niger 
and Cross rivers. The total area of the operation 
was 193 kilometres east to west and 144 
kilometres north to south, and operations lasted 
over four months.38 The British had a number of 
objectives that required a series of expeditions 
carriers for this massive operation. The white 
European officer ranks included at least a dozen 
Canadian officers at all levels and functions 
across the force. Major William Heneker was 
perhaps the most senior Canadian present in 
this campaign, being second in authority only 
to Lieutenant-Colonel Montanaro, the force 
commander. Heneker was born and raised in 
Sherbrooke, Quebec, and attended Bishop’s 
College before completing his education at 
RMC. After graduation in 1888 he accepted a 
commission in the Cannaught Rangers, and was 
seconded for duty in West Africa in June 1897. 
He would eventually become one of the most 
successful and noted commanders in the entire 
theatre.
 In November 1901 Lieutenant-Colonel 
Montanaro dispatched four converging 
columns towards Aro-Chuku [modern spelling 
Arochukwu], the capital of the Aro families. It was 
also considered to be the centre for Juju worship 
and was therefore Montanaro’s primary target. 
Major Heneker commanded No.4 Column of this 
expedition, his force consisting of 19 European 
officers as well as one local officer, 479 local 
rank and file, one Maxim gun and crew, 13 gun 
carriers, and 225 general carriers.40 Concentrated 
at Itu, his orders were to make a feint advance 
RMC graduate John Irving Lang-Hyde served with 
the Royal Engineers and was second-in-command 
of the Attabalu Expeditionary Force in West Africa 
in 1893. He was awarded the CMG for his role in 
the Nigerian Anglo-French Boundary Commission in 
1901.                                         (RMCC Photo)
against various factions of the Aro tribe. First and 
foremost, they wanted to open the Ibo country to 
peaceful trading and British-directed commerce 
and prevent further massacres and subjugations 
of the local populations by slave hunters and 
raiders. Second, they were keen to suppress the 
native Long Juju practices once and for all.39
 Lieutenant-Colonel A.F. Montanaro, then 
commanding the West African Field Force, 
deployed just over 2,000 soldiers and 2,300 
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towards Aro-Chuku to fix 
the Aro forces at or near 
their capital. This allowed 
the remaining columns to 
conduct other operations 
across the country and 
move towards the Aro 
capital without being 
frequently ambushed 
along the way.
 M a j o r  H e n e k e r 
conducted a series of 
reconnaissances-in-
force along the Enyong 
River until he reached 
the village of Esu-Itu on 
29 November. There he 
made a fortified camp 
and then continued on 8 
December with a smaller 
force in the direction of 
Aro-Chuku. His force was 
joined by No.2 Column 
under the command of 
Major A.M.N. Mackenzie 
on 20 December, which was 
incorporated into Heneker’s 
own column. A sizeable enemy 
force attacked him on the night 
of 24 December, and British force 
spent Christmas day and most of the 
next day in constant contact with their 
adversary.
 Under Heneker’s command during the 
fighting was a young Canadian named James 
Wayling. Commissioned as a major in the 12th 
Battalion, Canadian Militia (now the Royal York 
Rangers), Wayling had volunteered for West 
Africa and was subsequently seconded to the 
Southern Nigeria Regiment in 1901. Though he 
still retained his major’s rank in the Canadian 
militia, locally he was gazetted as a lieutenant. 
Wayling survived the Christmas battle and several 
subsequent engagements, including the capture 
and destruction of the Long Juju at Aro-Chuku.41 
His luck nearly ran out, however, a few weeks 
later in an ambush at Ikotobo on 26 January 
1902 while defending a water party.42 Wayling was 
saved from certain death at the last minute by the 
timely arrival of three fellow officers who were 
able to force the ambushers to retire. Lieutenant 
Wayling survived the Aro 
expedition, being mentioned-
in-dispatches three times for 
his service.43
The lion of West Africa. Born 
in Sherbrooke, Quebec, and 
a graduate of RMC, William 
Heneker would ﬁght in over 
a dozen campaigns along 
the Gold Coast and end his 
career as a full general in 
the British Army. 
(RMCC Photo)
   Sporadic fighting 
continued across the 
region well into the 
spring of 1902. A large 
engagement was fought at 
Edimma on 18 January, 
where a small force led by 
Captain J.C. Graham of 
the Highland Light Infantry 
was attacked by a much 
larger enemy contingent. 
During the fight, “Lieutenant 
A.E. Rastrick, Canadian 
Militia…who was in command 
of the Maxim, used it with great 
effect, and so good was the fire 
control and discipline that the 
enemy was forced to retreat….”44 The 
young Canadian officer not only brought 
the Aro attack to a dead stop, he forced them 
back into a rout that resulted in the subsequent 
capture of Edimma. For his actions, Rastrick was 
mentioned-in-dispatches.45
 The Aro expedition came to a climax when the 
British columns converged at Bende on 2 March 
1902 to face the last concentrated resistance. 
Major Heneker led the assault against the town, 
capturing it, and two senior Aro chiefs, within 
a day. Though the pacification and subjugation 
of the entire region was far from complete, the 
capture of Aro-Chuku and Bende meant that for 
the time being the main adversary was defeated. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Montanaro’s main force 
returned to the coast where he prepared his 
official dispatches for London.
 Despite this massive operation small local 
conflicts persisted, and British punitive and 
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pacification expeditions in Southern Nigeria 
continued until 1910. Archibald Hayes Macdonell, 
born in Toronto, served first as a scout, and 
then later as a platoon and company level 
commander in several of these operations.46 He 
had joined the Canadian militia in February 1886 
and was a company commander with the 2nd 
(Special Service) Battalion, The Royal Canadian 
Regiment of Infantry during the South African 
War. Macdonell was awarded the Distinguished 
Service Order for his actions at the Battle of 
Paardeberg. In 1901 Macdonell was seconded 
to the WAFF, and first saw action when he was 
attacked outside the town of Onor during the 
Ibeku-Olokoro expedition in Southern Nigeria in 
late 1902. His commander, Major Heneker, later 
wrote of the engagement,
Half a mile out of the friendly town of Onor 
the road ran along a narrow causeway about 
100 yards in length, and with a deep swamp 
on either side; there was a small stream at the 
enemy’s end of it which had to be waded. Fire 
was opened on [Macdonell’s] scouts…the scouts 
kept the enemy employed while the 75-milimetre 
and maxim were got into position. A heavy fire 
was then poured in….”47
Such actions were a regular occurrence in 
Southern Nigeria, and Lieutenant Macdonell 
quickly became one of Major Heneker’s best 
reconnaissance officers and combat leaders.
 Lieutenant Macdonell went on to serve in 
seven separate expeditions between 1901 and 
1904.48 By the time of his return to the Canadian 
militia he was one of its most experienced small 
wars veterans. Reverting to his rank of major, 
Macdonell later passed the Army’s staff college 
and was subsequently appointed to command 
The Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR). Lieutenant-
Colonel Macdonell took that unit overseas in 
1914, led it in action on the western front, 
subsequently commanding the 5th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade in 1916 upon his promotion to 
brigadier-general. 
 Still, Major William Heneker remains the most 
intriguing Canadian who served in this theatre. 
Between 1897 and 1906 he fought in no less 
than a dozen separate campaigns ranging from 
peacetime military engagements to major combat 
operations, earning the DSO for his efforts. More 
important perhaps, in 1907 he published Bush 
An operational planning map for the 1899 Benin Expedition showing key locations, travel distances, and timings hand 
drawn by William Heneker.  The map is remarkably accurate and he often credited his RMC education and training for 
being able to produce such documents.
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Warfare,49 a 196-page book which is an astute, 
articulate, and detailed study of small wars that 
was perhaps intended to advance if not supercede 
the ideas initiated by Charles Callwell’s well-
known 1896 publication, Small Wars: Their 
Principles and Practice.50 Almost completely 
forgotten by both British and Canadian military 
historians today, this book served as one of the 
trilogy51 of small war “bibles” for the British army 
until well after the First World War. In 1934 the 
War Office institutionalized the lessons of men 
like Callwell and Heneker, when it finally released 
its own internally-produced manual titled, Notes 
on Imperial Policing.52
 Heneker went on to serve in India and the 
northwest frontier before returning to Europe 
as a brigade commander and later division 
commander on the western front during the First 
World War. In 1920 he was appointed the first 
commander of the British Army on the Rhine, 
and then served as commander of the Inter-
Allied Commission of Management in Upper 
Silesia, stabilizing the tenuous borders between 
Germany and Poland. He retired in 1932 at the 
rank of full general after serving as commander-
in-chief of Southern Command, India. Yet 
Heneker is completely unknown in Canada, 
and like many of his colleagues, has yet to be 
recognized by Canadian military historians either 
for his innovative approach to operations in 
complex terrain that influenced later British and 
Canadian doctrines, or even his writings on the 
relationships between conflict and diplomacy.53
 In addition to those men detailed here there 
Already a decorated veteran of the South African War, 
Major A.H. Macdonell served in West Africa between 
1901-1904 and fought in seven major expeditions. 
He went on to command the RCR and later the 5th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade in the First World War.
(Library and Archives Canada PA-007525)
was several other serving Canadian militia 
officers who were seconded for duty in Nigeria. 
Lieutenant J.L.R. Parry, Canadian Militia, was 
mentioned-in-dispatches for his services during 
the Aro Expedition along with James Wayling.54 
Two brothers, Captain B.M. Read and Lieutenant 
Henry Read, as well as Second Lieutenant F. 
Homer-Dixon, all Canadian militia officers, served 
in this theatre beginning in 1902.55 Wayling would 
eventually be promoted to major and mentioned-
in-dispatches several further times. It is very 
likely that there were many others who served 
in this theatre as well but whose names have 
slipped through the cracks of history. Further 
investigation of the subject is certainly needed.
Conclusion
There are many points one could draw from the experience of Canadian officers in West 
Africa. Perhaps most important is the obvious 
fact that a significant aspect of the history of 
Canada’s Victorian and Edwardian army remains 
untold and little understood. With the main focus 
of published works on politics56 or operations in 
Saskatchewan and South Africa, little attention 
has been paid to other minor operations or the 
army’s intellectual and institutional evolution. A 
more thorough examination of subjects like the 
service of Canadian officers with British forces 
overseas will undoubtedly revise existing views 
and conclusions about what the Canadian army 
was and was not as well as how it evolved.
 This article reaffirms the fact that Canadian 
army biography is underdeveloped, and that 
many important personalities such as Lieutenant-
Colonel William Heneker and the young Lieutenant 
Archibald H. Macdonell remain forgotten. This 
is especially true regarding those officers and 
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men who served abroad prior to 
1939, many of whom are lost in the 
folds of national ambiguity between 
Canadian and British military service. 
Yet regardless of the uniform they 
wore at the time, their knowledge 
 This study also reinforces the 
argument that the Canadian army 
was shaped by individual as well as 
collective experiences prior to 1914. 
Many of the officers studied in this 
article returned to Canada at some 
point after their deployments to 
provide briefings, lectures, articles, 
and papers on what would be identified 
today as “lessons learned.” Narratives 
and analyses of their experiences 
appeared in professional Canadian 
military journals and magazines, 
and transcripts of their presentations 
were often reprinted in media such 
as The Proceedings of the Royal 
Military College Club of Canada or 
magazines published by the Royal 
Canadian Military Institute in Toronto 
or the Montreal Hunt Club. As well, in 
keeping with British army traditions 
of the day, professional development 
and operational corporate knowledge 
in Canada’s army was often passed along 
verbally or through the publication of private 
analyses such as Lieutenant-Colonel Heneker’s 
Bush Warfare, rather than via official doctrine 
manuals.58 Heneker notes this informal approach 
to sharing knowledge and teaching lessons in the 
introduction to his book: “Should any officer…
happen to peruse these notes, and should he, 
perchance, come across anything which may be 
of use to him, the following pages will have served 
the purpose for which they were written.”59
 Finally, it is very likely that better knowledge 
of the experiences of Canadian officers with 
British forces prior to the Great War will force 
a reassessment of the nature of relationships 
in the Canadian Expeditionary Force as well as 
the nature of its British influences, particularly 
within the 1st Canadian Division. Many active 
service field grade officers (majors and above) 
in the Canadian army in 1914 had spent the 
majority of their careers up to that point seconded 
to the British army and fighting small wars 
and counterinsurgencies in places like Africa, 
northwestern India, and southeast Asia. This 
previous experience obviously influenced their 
early ideas about what combat would be like on 
the western front. It also revealed their potential 
limitations as commanders. Campaigning in West 
Africa seldom involved more than a brigade of 
troops, and though the logistics were complicated 
The African General Service Medal with bar 
for the Aro Campaign.
(Andrew Godefroy collection)
and experiences was often shared 
between the two forces, and one 
cannot consider and assess the pre-
Great War evolution of the Canadian 
army at home without giving some 
consideration to those Canadians 
who served overseas. As well, it is 
important to appreciate that on many 
occasions Canadians influenced the 
British army just as much as the 
British influenced the Canadian army. 
That three successive Canadians 
held the post of Commanding Royal 
Engineers for all of West Africa between 1887 
and 1894 with a fourth Canadian following soon 
after, for example, is a point of leadership that 
must be recognized.57
 The evidence in this article suggests that 
the Canadian officer corps was more engaged 
in international affairs, military operations, 
and strategic studies than has previously been 
credited. As well, there is a poor understanding 
of how these external relationships affected the 
evolution of the Canadian army at home and how 
or why these influences did or did not do more to 
create a certain type of field force. Current debates 
concerning Canadian army conceptual and 
doctrinal design, for example, regularly criticize 
its networked approach to force development 
as paying too little consideration to Canadian 
culture and military traditions. Yet as more of the 
army’s history is examined, it becomes clearer 
that its evolution has always been one of blending 
influences and best practices from a wide range 
of experiences. Canadians serving in West Africa 
between 1885 and 1905 very likely cared much 
less whether or not they were uniquely identified 
as “British” or “Canadian” than the historians 
who examine them today. Though always proud 
of their origins, the transparency of their national 
allegiance and service was beneficial to both the 
Canadian and British armies, who defended the 
interests of the same empire.
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the staff work was not. The massive expansion 
of forces and the corps and army level scale of 
operations proved a tremendous challenge for 
officers who spent the majority of their careers 
fighting small wars and counterinsurgencies.
 In the past too much has been made 
of the fact that a large portion of the early 
volunteers for the first Canadian contingent 
were British expatriates. As ongoing research 
is demonstrating, Canadians made substantial 
commitments to imperial defence not just during 
the flashpoint that was the South African War, but 
rather constantly during the late 19th and early 
20th centuries.60 Between 1885 and 1905 British 
law and order in West Africa was ending the large-
scale enslavement of Africans and bringing them 
into the British sphere of influence. Canadians 
serving in both the Canadian and British armies 
played a substantial role in this process. It 
mattered little to them whether one was born in 
London or Ottawa.
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Der Weltkreig  is  an invaluable 
contemporary source, and that it 
must be considered in the analysis of 
the history and historiography of the 
First World War. However, using this 
quote out of context to overstate the 
factual correctness of these volumes 
is folly. Reichsarchiv files made 
available since the end of the Cold War 
undeniably confirm the value of the 
official work, but these new sources 
have also demonstrated where there 
are significant weaknesses in the official 
histories, especially when addressing 
issues regarding grand strategy and the 
roles played by senior command. Among 
others, historian Robert Foley made this 
very clear in his recent study of Erich 
von Falkenhayn, which demonstrates 
considerable differences between newly 
available primary sources and the 
“official” German account published 
after the war.
 Historians are right to be wary 
of these and other official postwar 
German publications, and their caution 
does not stem simply from a lack of 
understanding of the language or its 
form. As well, as Strachan correctly 
points out, neither would serious 
scholars attribute this caution to the 
possible influences of Nazism. As 
recently discussed by historian Alan 
Kramer in his examination of culture 
and mass killing in the First World 
War, it has become common knowledge 
that in the 1920s Germany launched a 
mammoth historical research project 
in which the foreign ministry secretly 
paid both German and foreign scholars, 
notably in France and the USA, to 
support written accounts that stated 
Prussia was not to blame for the war. 
Therefore it is hardly surprising to 
find western contemporary quotes, 
such as that from Alexander Johnson 
(CMH vol.16/3 p.58), which portrays 
Der Weltkreig in a positive light. In any 
brief survey of other American historical 
journals during this period, one will 
find similar superfluous compliments. 
This activity, along with other officially 
published German apologia and 
protection of military reputations, is the 
backdrop against which Der Weltkreig 
must be examined and understood.
 At the end of the day, Canadian 
military historians will benefit from the 
translation of Der Weltkreig, as it will 
allow at least more balanced general 
narratives of CEF operations to be 
written in the future. For more detailed 
historical analyses, however, historians 
must remain vigilant in their scrutiny 
of the accuracy of these accounts in 
the corroboration of facts concerning 
German operations on the western 
front. For it is corroboration and 
context, not compliments, which will 
determine the value of Der Weltkreig 
as evidence.
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